Name: Imperfect Union: Representation and Taxation in Multilevel Governments (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) (en Inglés)
Price: 38.09 USD
Availability: InStock
Author: Christopher R. Berry
ISBN: 9780521758352

portada Imperfect Union: Representation and Taxation in Multilevel Governments (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Editorial

Cambridge University Press

Autor

Christopher R. Berry

Año

2009

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

274

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

ISBN

0521758351

ISBN13

9780521758352

N° edición

Categorías

Salud pública y medicina preventiva

Imperfect Union: Representation and Taxation in Multilevel Governments (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) (en Inglés)

Christopher R. Berry (Autor) · Cambridge University Press · Tapa Blanda

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Reseña del libro "Imperfect Union: Representation and Taxation in Multilevel Governments (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) (en Inglés)"

This book offers the first political theory of special purpose jurisdictions, including 35,000 special districts and 13,500 school districts, which constitute the most common form of local government in the United States today. Collectively, special purpose governments have more civilian employees than the federal government and spend more than all city governments combined. The proliferation of special purpose jurisdictions has fundamentally altered the nature of representation and taxation in local government. Citizens today are commonly represented by dozens - in some cases hundreds - of local officials in multiple layers of government. As a result, political participation in local elections is low and special interest groups associated with each function exert disproportionate influence. With multiple special-interest governments tapping the same tax base, the local tax base takes on the character of a common-pool resource, leading to familiar problems of overexploitation. Strong political parties can often mitigate the common-pool problem by informally coordinating the policies of multiple overlapping governments.