Name: Advances in Mathematical Economics (en Inglés)
SKU: 57100921
Price: 104.94 USD
Availability: InStock
Author: Kusuoka, Shigeo ; Maruyama, Toru
ISBN: 9784431659334

portada Advances in Mathematical Economics (en Inglés)

Advances in Mathematical Economics (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Autor

Shigeo Kusuoka

Toru Maruyama

Editorial

Springer

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

164

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

Dimensiones

23.4x15.6x0.9 cm

Peso

0.25 kg.

ISBN13

9784431659334

Categorías

Teoría y filosofía económicas
Teoría del juego
Matemáticas aplicadas

Advances in Mathematical Economics (en Inglés)

Shigeo Kusuoka (Autor) · Toru Maruyama (Autor) · Springer · Tapa Blanda

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Reseña del libro "Advances in Mathematical Economics (en Inglés)"

The role of asymmetric information in allocation of resources, together with the associated information-revelation process, has long been a central focus of economic research. While the bulk of the literature addresses these is- sues within the framework of principal-agent relationship, which essentially reduces the problem to the sole principal's (the sole Stackelberg leader's) optimization problem subject to the agents' (the Stackelberg followers') re- sponses, there are recent attempts to extend analysis to other economic setups characterized by different relationships among decision-makers. A notable strand of such attempts is the core analysis of incomplete in- formation. Here, there is no Stackelberg-type relationship, and more impor- tantly the players can talk to each other for coordinated choice of strategies. See, e.g., Wilson (1978) for a pioneering work; Yannelis (1991) for formula- tion of feasibility of a strategy as its measurability; Ichiishi and Idzik (1996) for introduction of Bayesian incentive-compatibility to this strand; Ichiishi, Idzik and Zhao (1994) for information revelation (that is, endogenous deter- mination of updated information structures); Ichiishi and Radner (1997) and Ichiishi and Sertel (1998) for studies of a specific model of Chandler's firm in multidivisional form for sharper results; and Vohra (1999) for a recent work. It is a common postulate in these works that every player takes part in design of a mechanism and also in execution of the signed contract.