Name: Contract Theory (The mit Press) (en Inglés)
SKU: 1709480
Price: 84.76 USD
Availability: InStock
Author: Patrick Bolton; Mathias Dewatripont

portada Contract Theory (The mit Press) (en Inglés)

Contract Theory (The mit Press) (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Editorial

Mit Press

Autor

Patrick Bolton; Mathias Dewatripont

Año

2004

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

744

Encuadernación

Tapa Dura

Peso

ISBN

0262025760

ISBN13

9780262025768

Contract Theory (The mit Press) (en Inglés)

Patrick Bolton; Mathias Dewatripont (Autor) · Mit Press · Tapa Dura

Libro Nuevo Importado

Envío: 17 a 27 días háb.

$ 169.51$ 84.76

-50%

Costos de importación incluídos en el precio ✅

Libro Nuevo

Quedan 20 unidades

$ 84.76

Llega entre el 17 Sep y el 05 Oct a Quito, Pichincha. Seleccionar ubicación

Agregar a lista de deseos

Reseña del libro "Contract Theory (The mit Press) (en Inglés)"

A comprehensive introduction to contract theory, emphasizing common themes and methodologies as well as applications in key areas.Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book.