Name: Detecting Peripheral-Based Attacks on the Host Memory (T-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services) (en Inglés)
SKU: 50879227
Price: 95.37 USD
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Author: Patrick Stewin

portada Detecting Peripheral-Based Attacks on the Host Memory (T-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services) (en Inglés)

Detecting Peripheral-Based Attacks on the Host Memory (T-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services) (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Editorial

Springer

Autor

Patrick Stewin

Año

2015

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

126

Encuadernación

Tapa Dura

ISBN13

9783319135144

N° edición

Categorías

Seguridad informática

Detecting Peripheral-Based Attacks on the Host Memory (T-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services) (en Inglés)

Patrick Stewin (Autor) · Springer · Tapa Dura

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Reseña del libro "Detecting Peripheral-Based Attacks on the Host Memory (T-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services) (en Inglés)"

This work addresses stealthy peripheral-based attacks on host computers and presents a new approach to detecting them. Peripherals can be regarded as separate systems that have a dedicated processor and dedicated runtime memory to handle their tasks. The book addresses the problem that peripherals generally communicate with the host via the host's main memory, storing cryptographic keys, passwords, opened files and other sensitive data in the process - an aspect attackers are quick to exploit. Here, stealthy malicious software based on isolated micro-controllers is implemented to conduct an attack analysis, the results of which provide the basis for developing a novel runtime detector. The detector reveals stealthy peripheral-based attacks on the host's main memory by exploiting certain hardware properties, while a permanent and resource-efficient measurement strategy ensures that the detector is also capable of detecting transient attacks, which can otherwise succeed when the applied strategy only measures intermittently. Attackers exploit this strategy by attacking the system in between two measurements and erasing all traces of the attack before the system is measured again.