Name: Job Insecurity isn't Always Efficient
SKU: 57464164
Availability: OutOfStock
Author: Federal Trade Commission

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portada Job Insecurity isn't Always Efficient

Formato

Libro Físico

Editorial

Createspace

Autor

Federal Trade Commission

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

Dimensiones

28x21.6x0.2 cm

Peso

0.10 kg.

ISBN13

9781502479853

Categorías

Empresa y gestión

Job Insecurity isn't Always Efficient

Federal Trade Commission (Autor) · Createspace · Tapa Blanda

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Reseña del libro "Job Insecurity isn't Always Efficient"

Workers value job security. If at least some workers value it enough, then it is efficient for at least some firms to adopt policies in which they commit (implicitly or explicitly) not to dismiss employees except for "just-cause," as opposed to policies in which employers are free to dismiss employees "at-will." In this paper, we develop a simple model in which the equilibrium distribution of workers between just-cause firms and at-will firms is not generally efficient: there can be inefficiently many workers in just-cause firms or inefficiently few. If there are inefficiently few, then a tax or even a ban on at-will firms can be welfare-improving.