Name: phenomenological explanations (en Inglés)
SKU: 24796432
Price: 95.47 USD
Availability: InStock
Author: Lingis, A.
ISBN: 9789024733330

portada phenomenological explanations (en Inglés)

phenomenological explanations (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Autor

A. Lingis

Editorial

Springer

Año

1997

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

112

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

Dimensiones

23.4x15.6x0.7 cm

Peso

0.19 kg.

ISBN

9024733332

ISBN13

9789024733330

Categorías

Fenomenología y existencialismo
Filosofía: epistemología y teoría del conocimiento
Jardinería

phenomenological explanations (en Inglés)

A. Lingis (Autor) · Springer · Tapa Blanda

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Reseña del libro "phenomenological explanations (en Inglés)"

The intentional analysis devised by phenomenology was first used to explain the meaningfulness of expressions; it aimed at exhibiting the original primary substrates that expressions refer to, and at exhibiting the subjective acts that make signs expressive. The explanation of predicative expressions was then extended to the antecedent layer of prepredicative, perceptual experiences, explaining these by locating, with peculiar kinds of immanent intuitions, the original sensile data which evidence the bodily presence of the real - and by reactivating the informin- formulating, interpreting and the informing-forming subjective acts that make of the sensile data, or material, perceived things. Intentional analysis explains by decomposing the derivate references back to the original references, and by leading the mind's intentions back to the givens they refer to. Can this kind of explanation be extended? The investigations of this book have taken this question in different directions. Can phenomenological explanation be extended to exhibit not only the act-character of the mind, but its substance, its affective materiality, its locomotion, its impressed haecceity, in short, its corporeality (Chapter I)? Shall not the explanation explain that if the terra firma of being, in the maximum proximity where distance no longer introduces indeterminability, is never reached, this is not because of the defects and the finitude of our mind, but because being itself is not there as the answer, positive and affirmative - being itself is in the interrogative mood (Chapter II)? If the given being itself is in the x Preface